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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, plea bargaining is an essential component of the American
criminal justice system.' While there is neither a constitutional right of the
accused to plea bargain, nor a government duty to offer a plea bargain, it is
generally considered a beneficial practice for all parties involved.2
The Sixth Amendment protects several rights of those accused in
criminal trials; among these is the right to effective counsel. In Lafler v.
Cooper and Missouri v. Frye, the Supreme Court ruled that this right
applies retroactively to the plea bargaining process.4 However, defendants
are only entitled to a remedy if their counsel's ineffectiveness prejudiced
the result of their trial, and this determination is made using the test
established in Strickland v. Washington.
This Comment argues that the Supreme Court was incorrect in finding a
violation of the defendants' Sixth Amendment rights in Cooper and Frye.
The Court's holdings in these two cases imply a constitutional right to plea
bargain, although this is completely refuted by prior case law, and the
circuitous remedy not only violates legal precedent, but also is too arbitrary
1. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (observing that guilty pleas
currently lead to ninety-four percent of state convictions and ninety-seven percent of
federal convictions).
2. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (commenting that defendants
benefit by avoiding pretrial incarceration and the stresses of trial, while judges and
prosecutors benefit by conserving important resources).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (granting those accused of a crime the assistance of
counsel for their defense during a speedy, public trial by an impartial jury).
4. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (explaining that constitutional rights extend
regardless of a defendant's guilt); Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1402 (2012)(stating that plea bargaining is a critical stage of the criminal process, and the right to
effective assistance of counsel applies to all critical stages of the criminal procedure).
5. 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (requiring defendants to satisfy both prongs of the
Strickland test to prove that their conviction was derived from an unreliable judicial
process and must be vacated).
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and illogical to be effective law.6 Part II summarizes the history of Sixth
Amendment analysis of the right to effective counsel, as well as the
extension of that right to the plea bargaining process. Part II also
introduces the facts of Cooper and Frye and briefly discusses the Court's
opinions from each case.8 Part III argues against the Court's extension of
Sixth Amendment rights to Cooper and Frye because neither case involved
an interference with the defendants' right to a fair trial. 9 Additionally, Part
III contends that the Court's application of the Strickland analysis in these
two cases conflicts with the established precedent that defendants are not
constitutionally entitled to receive plea bargains.' 0 Part III also argues that
the remedy implemented in Cooper violates both prosecutorial discretion
and the separation of powers doctrine, in addition to being too arbitrary and
inefficient." Part IV identifies several legal complexities arising from
these decisions that the Court will need to resolve in numerous additional
cases.12 Finally, Part V concludes that the Court should reverse these two
decisions and return to the traditional jurisprudence governing the Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel, as failure to do so could impede the
plea bargaining process and burden the criminal justice system. 13
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Sixth Amendment and the Right to Effective Counsel
The Sixth Amendment sets forth several rights for defendants in criminal
6. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1390 (finding that Cooper's attorney satisfied both
the performance and prejudice prongs of the Strickland analysis); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at
1410 (holding that Frye's attorney's actions did not meet the necessary standard of
reasonableness).
7. See infra Part II (explaining the evolution of the right to effective counsel and
its specific application to the plea bargaining process).
8. See infra Part II (asserting that the Court's extension of the Strickland analysis
to Cooper and Frye is based on the overwhelming number of plea bargains that are
accepted by courts).
9. See infra Part III (arguing that the Court failed to consider the purpose behind
the Sixth Amendment when applying it).
10. See infra Part III (contending that the Court's holdings in Cooper and Frye
impliedly create a constitutional entitlement to plea bargaining).
11. See infra Part III (maintaining that the remedy proposed by these cases instills
excess power into the hands of trial court judges, infringes on prosecutorial discretion,
and constitutes a separation of powers violation).
12. See infra Part IV (noting that the Court's decisions in Cooper and Frye prompt
a conflict between defense counsels' goals, establish a standard that will require
clarification through further cases, and may jeopardize the effectiveness of plea
bargaining).
13. See infra Part V (observing that the Court has created a new field of law while
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prosecutions, including the right "to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."' 4 This clause recognizes the right to counsel's assistance,
ensuring that defendants receive a fair trial.'5 In 1970, the Supreme Court
in McMann v. Richardson established that this right to counsel requires
effective and competent legal representation for defendants.'6 However,
the Court explicitly refused to further define this standard of
effectiveness.' 7  Accordingly, in Tollett v. Henderson, the Court only
required counsel to act within the range of competence necessary for
criminal law attorneys.' 8  The Court eventually articulated a test for
ineffective assistance claims in Strickland.19
B. The Right to Effective Counsel and the Strickland Test
In Strickland, the Court recognized the purpose of the Sixth Amendment
and its necessity to protect a defendant's right to a fair trial.20 Thus, the
purpose behind the Sixth Amendment's requirement for effective
assistance of counsel is also protection of a fair trial.2 1 Moreover, this
purpose of ensuring a fair trial also presents the limits of Sixth Amendment
protection.22 The Court stated that claims of ineffective counsel are only
recognizable when an attorney's ineffectiveness impeded the adversarial
proceeding to the point that the result at trial is no longer reliable. 23
In Strickland, the Court established two requirements necessary to show
that counsel's lack of effective assistance led to an unreliable conviction
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI (securing a defendant's right to know the crime for
which he is accused and be tried where the crime allegedly occurred).
15. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984) (declaring that the Sixth
Amendment is not implicated unless the reliability of the trial procedure is called into
question).
16. See 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (evaluating counsel's performance in comparison
with the spectrum of criminal attorney practices).
17. See id. (holding that determinations of ineffective counsel should be left to trial
court judges to maintain proper standards of performance).
18. See 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (stating that an attorney's failure to properly
investigate facts of a constitutional claim may satisfy this standard of proof for showing
incompetence).
19. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 684 (1984) (explaining that,
before this case, the Court had never completely addressed the issue of ineffective
counsel where the case went to trial).
20. See id. at 687 (indicating that the standard for "adequate legal assistance" under
the Sixth Amendment is reasonableness under prevalent professional standards).
21. See id. at 686-87 (claiming that judgments should not be set aside unless
counsel's errors had an effect on the judgment that made the proceeding unreliable).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 147 (2006)
(explaining that effective counsel is not the equivalent of mistake-free legal
representation).
23. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686-93 (opining that any error can impair the
presentation of a defense, but the right to effective counsel is only violated when the
errors are serious enough to necessitate throwing out the proceeding).
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requiring reversal.24 First, a defendant must show that his counsel's
performance was ineffective to the extent that it cannot be said to have
constituted "counsel" under the Sixth Amendment. 25 This is referred to as
the "performance prong" of the Strickland analysis. 2 6 The Court refused,
however, to specifically explain how determinations of counsel's
effectiveness should be made, simply stating that attorney performance is
owed substantial deference.2 7
Second, under the Strickland test, a defendant must satisfy the "prejudice
prong" by showing that his counsel's ineffectiveness was substantial
enough to deprive him of a reliable result at trial.28 Thus, a defendant must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that his trial would have arrived at a
different result had counsel's assistance been effective.29
C. Ineffective Assistance Under Strickland
Several cases following Strickland exemplify what constitutes
ineffective assistance under the performance prong of the Strickland
analysis. 30  In Kimmelman v. Morrison, the Court found actual
ineffectiveness under Strickland where the defense counsel did not perform
pretrial investigation and, consequently, failed to discover important
evidence held by the State that could have been suppressed prior to trial.3 1
In 2003, the Court held in Wiggins v. Smith that a defense attorney's failure
to investigate and present his client's difficult life history as a mitigating
circumstance at trial satisfied the Strickland test.3 2 However, the Court
24. See id at 687 (mandating that a defendant make both showings to prove that a
conviction is unreliable).
25. See id. (requiring defendants to show that their defense counsel failed to meet
an objective standard of reasonableness based on the practices of the legal community).
26. See id. at 697 (explaining that a defendant's failure to demonstrate either
component of the test precludes the Court from addressing the other component).
27. See id. at 689 (reasoning that a set of detailed rules for attorney conduct would
interfere with a counsel's independence in making appropriate tactical decisions for
clients).
28. See id. at 687 (observing a presumption of prejudice in cases where there is
constructive or actual deprivation of representation or where counsel has a conflict of
interest).
29. See id. at 694 (communicating that a reasonable probability is one sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome).
30. See generally JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL § 4:8 (2012) (surmising that a defendant's actions toward
counsel play a crucial role in investigating the reasonableness of counsel's actions).
31. See 477 U.S. 365, 385 (1986) (concluding that the defense counsel's
sufficiency in other respects and overall performance do not alleviate his failure to
conduct pretrial discovery, although that sufficiency was significant for effectiveness
analysis).
32. See 539 U.S. 510, 512 (2003) (concluding that tactical decisions made after a
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found the Strickland test was not met in United States v. Mechanik;
although the defense attorney was ineffective under the performance prong
of Strickland for failing to move to dismiss the defendant's indictment over
a procedural issue, the prejudice prong was not satisfied because the
subsequent legitimate trial made this mistake "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt." 33
In two additional cases, the Court held that the prejudice analysis under
Strickland is only applicable when it is impossible to rely upon the
outcome of the judicial process in question.34 First, in Lockhart v. Fretwell,
the Court found that Fretwell was not prejudiced by his counsel's mistake
in missing an opportunity to object and invalidate Fretwell's capital
conviction, even though the result at trial would have been different
without the attorney's mistake.3 5 Second, in Nix v. Whiteside, the Court
held that the defense counsel's failure to allow the defendant to commit
perjury in an attempt to be acquitted does not satisfy Strickland prejudice,
even though the result at trial would likely be different.36
D. The Right to Effective Counsel During Plea Bargaining
1. Applying Strickland to Plea Bargaining
In Hill v. Lockhart, the Court expanded the right of effective counsel to
plea bargaining, requiring effective counsel before a defendant accepts a
deal.37 In Iowa v. Tovar, the Court justified this expansion by describing
guilty pleas as an important point in the criminal justice process.3 8
33. See 475 U.S. 66, 70, 72-73 (1986) (ruling that the guilty verdict at trial made
harmless any error in the pre-trial grand jury proceedings and that the societal costs of
retrial did not justify vacating a guilty verdict over a pre-trial error).
34. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 15-16,
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2011) (No. 10-444) (requiring claims of Strickland
prejudice to show that the trial was unfair rather than simply showing that the result at
trial was affected).
35. See id. at 16 (contending that a proceeding is unfair, and the result is not
reliable, when mistakes by defense counsel cause a defendant's forfeiture of a
substantive or procedural right); see also Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369
(1993) (finding that generally, the Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel is only
implicated when the fairness of the trial is questioned).
36. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 34, at 17 (stating that the defendant received a fair trial and did not suffer a loss of
any procedural or substantive right; thus, the defendant could not successfully make a
Strickland prejudice claim); see also Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175 (1986)
(ordering defendants bringing Strickland claims to show a reasonable probability that a
proceeding's outcome would have been different and that the original proceeding was
unfair).
37. See 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (finding that the Strickland analysis must be used
for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel during guilty pleas).
38. See 541 U.S. 77, 80-81 (2004) (concluding that defendants of misdemeanor and
felony charges facing incarceration are protected under the Sixth Amendment); see also
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When applying Strickland's analysis to plea bargaining, the performance
prong requires counsel to meet the aforementioned standard for
incompetence before acceptance of the plea offer. 39  The prejudice
requirement-that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of ineffective
assistance of counsel-hinges on whether the defendant shows a reasonable
probability that he would not have pleaded guilty and would have
demanded to proceed to trial if counsel had been effective.4 0
2. Defining "Effective Assistance of Counsel" in the Context of Plea
Bargaining
In recent years, the Court has clarified what constitutes ineffective
assistance of counsel in relation to a plea bargain.4' In Padilla v. Kentucky,
the Court held that an attorney's failure to inform a defendant of the effects
of a guilty plea on the defendant's immigration status constituted
incompetent counsel under the performance prong of the Strickland test.4 2
While the Court in Padilla discussed the standard of performance required
of defense attorneys prior to acceptance of a guilty plea, the Court in Hill
refused to discuss the performance prong of Strickland because the
prejudice prong was not met.43
3. Remedies for Defendants Who Establish Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel During Plea Bargaining
In Lafler v. Cooper, the Court dismissed the argument that a fair trial
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (noting that plea bargaining is a vital
point during litigation for Sixth Amendment purposes involving effective assistance of
counsel).
39. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58-59 (finding the first part of the Strickland analysis to be
a restatement of the standard for competent counsel in McMann v. Richardson and
Tollett v. Henderson); see also Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973)
(holding that an attorney's failure to investigate or analyze facts prompting a
constitutional claim may meet the standard of proof required to show incompetent
counsel); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970) (allowing trial court
judges to enforce proper standards of attorney competence).
40. See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (framing the issue as a determination of whether the
result of the plea bargaining process was altered by the constitutional violation of
ineffective performance of counsel).
41. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (examining whether a
defense attorney has a duty to advise a defendant of the implications that a guilty plea
will have on his immigration status).
42. See id. (holding that when deportation is an evident consequence of entering a
guilty plea, defense counsel is responsible for providing correct legal advice on this
matter).
43. See id at 1482 (confirming that the constitutional standard required of defense
counsel under Strickland is reasonableness as based on the practices of the legal
community); Hill, 474 U.S. at 60 (finding that the facts of this case failed to show
Strickland prejudice because the defendant did not state that, given additional
information, he would have pled not guilty and insisted on trial).
2013] 687
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neutralizes any claim of ineffective performance by counsel during plea
bargaining.4 From its origin, the Supreme Court has set forth the principle
that, in keeping with the separation of powers, the judiciary should not
question executive officials' performance of discretionary
responsibilities. 4 5 Thus, prosecutors traditionally have discretion in choices
involving plea bargains as a function of executive authority.46 According
to Cooper, however, if a defendant would have only received a lesser
sentence from a plea bargain, and it is determined that the defendant would
have accepted the plea bargain without counsel's mistake, it is up to the
judge's discretion whether to mandate the sentence provided in the original
plea, the sentence levied at trial, or an alternative sentence.47 In situations
where the plea bargain involved a lesser charge than the trial conviction, it
may be necessary to reoffer the plea proposal and allow a judge to
determine whether to accept it.4 8
4. Lafler v. Cooper
In Lafler v. Cooper, Anthony Cooper was charged in Michigan with four
crimes, including assault with intent to murder, for pursuing Kali Mundy
and shooting at her multiple times. 49 The prosecution offered to drop two
of the four charges and recommend a fifty-one to eighty-five month
sentence in exchange for a guilty plea.o Cooper expressed guilt and
communicated that he was willing to accept the offer, but eventually
rejected the offer. 5  At trial, Cooper was convicted on all counts and
received a sentence of 185-360 months in prison.5
Cooper claimed ineffective counsel, alleging that his attorney advised
44. 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (stating that the justice system is one of pleas, not
trials).
45. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (asserting that the
Supreme Court is responsible for decisions involving individual rights but not
discretionary functions of executive officers).
46. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (explaining that the
executive branch possesses complete discretion in choosing whether or not to prosecute
a specific case).
47. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1389 (commenting that resentencing may not always
remedy a defendant's constitutional injury, especially where a plea offer for a less
serious offense is lost, at which point the original offer may require reinstatement).
48. See id. (describing circumstances where a defendant pleads guilty to counts
more serious than those in the originally offered plea bargain).
49. See id. at 1383 (commenting that Cooper may have been acting in self-defense,
but his motivation for shooting at the victim was unclear).
50. See id (explaining that Cooper was charged with six different offenses).
51. See id. (justifying Cooper's rejection of the plea bargain by alleging that
counsel said it would be impossible to establish intent to murder because the victim
was shot below the waist).
52. See id (noting that Cooper's sentence was within the mandatory minimum).
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him to reject the offer due to counsel's belief that the prosecution could not
establish intent to murder because Cooper shot Mundy below the waist.53
After several appeals, the District Court overturned the decision under the
Strickland test and mandated specific performance of the original plea
bargain.54 After the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District
Court's decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.s
5. Missouri v. Frye
In Missouri v. Frye, Galin Frye was charged with driving with a revoked
license for a fourth time, constituting a felony under Missouri law with a
maximum sentence of four years imprisonment. The prosecutor offered
two possible plea bargains via a letter to Frye's attorney, but counsel did
not mention the offers to Frye, and they expired. Before his preliminary
hearing, Frye was again arrested for driving without a license, pled guilty,
and received a three-year sentence.58  Frye claimed that his attorney's
failure to disclose the two plea bargains violated his right to effective
counsel.59 The Missouri Court of Appeals reversed the decision, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.60 The Court held that the Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends to all critical
stages of criminal justice proceedings-including consideration of rejected
or expired plea offers-and remanded the case to the Missouri Court of
Appeals to determine whether Strickland prejudice had been shown.61
53. See id (justifying Cooper's behavioral change from admitting guilt and
showing interest in plea offers to his refusal of two different plea bargains).
54. See id at 1384 (describing Cooper's appeal for federal habeas relief under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, and mandating reinstatement of
a fifty-one to eighty-five month sentence).
55. See Cooper v. Lafler, 376 F. App'x 563, 573 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 131
S. Ct. 856 (2012) (No. 09-1487) (finding that Strickland was met because Cooper
showed that counsel told him of an incorrect legal rule that led to a harsher sentence).
56. 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012) (detailing the Class D Felony with which Frye
was charged in August 2007).
57. See id (discussing the prosecution's first offer of a three-year sentence in
exchange for a guilty plea to the felony charge and second offer to reduce the offense to
a misdemeanor, and recommending a ninety-day sentence in exchange for a guilty
plea).
58. See id at 1404-05 (describing the prosecution's recommendation and thejudge's sentence of a three-year sentence and ten days of incarceration, known as
"shock time," to coerce future law-abiding behavior).
59. See id at 1405 (stating that Frye would have accepted the plea bargain for the
misdemeanor charge).
60. See Frye v. State, 311 S.W.3d 350, 360-61 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010), cert. granted,
131 S. Ct. 856 (2011) (ordering Frye to either go to trial or plead guilty; his right to
effective counsel was not infringed by his attorney's failure to mention the plea offer).
61. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405, 1411 (listing arraignments, interrogations, lineups,
and entry of guilty pleas as critical stages in criminal proceedings).
2013]1 689
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Court Erred in Finding a Sixth Amendment Issue in Cooper and
Frye Because Neither Case Involved an Impediment to the Defendants'
Right to a Fair Trial.
1. Cooper Did Not Suffer Prejudice Under Strickland Because His Case
Involved Rejection-Not A cceptance-of a Plea Offer, and He Suffered No
Impediments to His Right to a Fair Trial.
When the Court extended Sixth Amendment rights in Cooper, it was
wrong to apply the Strickland test to the rejection of a plea bargain.62 In
Cooper, the Court began its analysis by reasserting that defendants' Sixth
Amendment rights apply to plea bargaining.6 3 In Hill and Padilla, the right
to effective assistance of counsel was implicated before the defendants
accepted plea agreements. 4  Contrarily, Cooper involved a defendant's
rejection of a plea agreement and decision to proceed with a fair trial.6 1
Thus, no Sixth Amendment issue arose in Cooper because it involved a
defendant's decision to proceed to a fair trial and reject a plea offer, not the
decision to accept a plea bargain.66 Further, Cooper still retained his Sixth
Amendment rights after rejecting the prosecution's plea offer; if defense
counsel was ineffective during trial, he still could bring a constitutional
claim under the Sixth Amendment. 67
Moreover, the right to effective counsel was not an issue in this case
62. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1393 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(recognizing that the purpose of the right to effective assistance of counsel is to protect
a defendant's right to a fair trial).
63. See id. at 1384 (majority opinion) (holding that defendants are entitled to
effective counsel during plea bargaining).
64. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1480-81 (2010) (mandating that
defendants are entitled to effective counsel before deciding whether to accept a plea
deal); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985) (elucidating the focus of McMann v.
Richardson that all defendants charged with felonies have a right to effective counsel
when deciding whether to plead guilty); see also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S.
759, 771 (1970) (leaving the trial courts with discretion as to what constitutes effective
counsel, but noting that defendants facing felony charges have a right to competent
counsel).
65. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1385 (finding that expansion of the Strickland test
was consistent with appellate court decisions and did not cause problems).
66. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486 (affirming that negotiation of a plea bargain is a
critical point at which Sixth Amendment rights must be protected); see also Frye, 132
S. Ct. at 1407-08 (2012) (alleging that criminal defendants require effective counsel
during plea bargaining). But see Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1388 (holding that a defendant's
guilt does not prove effective performance of counsel or negate a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel).
67. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1398 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (undermining the Court's
decision invalidating Cooper's conviction after he received a fair criminal trial in
accordance with constitutional guidelines).
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because the defendant's right to a fair trial was not violated. Cooper
involved application of the Strickland test where counsel's deficient
assistance led to the defendant's refusal of a plea agreement and subsequent
conviction at trial.6 9 Because both parties agreed in this case that defense
counsel's performance was insufficient under the performance prong of
Strickland, whether Cooper's Sixth Amendment rights were violated
hinged on the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. 70 The Court held that
the prejudice requirement of Strickland was met because the defendant
showed a reasonable probability that all parties involved would have
accepted the guilty plea were it not for his attorney's ineffective
assistance.
However, Cooper's right to a fair trial was not violated.72 Thus, he
cannot bring a Sixth Amendment claim; such issues are only
constitutionally significant when they deprive the defendant of the ability
to receive a fair trial.73 Because the government is not responsible for
ineffective assistance of defense counsel, the Sixth Amendment must only
be invoked where the trial does not produce a just result.74 Cooper's
decision to reject the plea bargain and proceed with a trial based on his
counsel's mistake does not provide a legitimate ground for a Sixth
Amendment claim because he received a fair trial. Cooper knowingly
and voluntarily rejected two plea offers, chose to go to trial, and, upon an
68. See id at 1393 (majority opinion) (conveying that ineffective counsel must call
into question the proper functioning of the judicial process to be constitutionally
significant).
69. See id. at 1385 (explaining that the injury alleged in this case is the trial itself,
and in such cases, defendants must show that the plea bargain would have been
presented to the court without withdrawal, been accepted, and contained a lower
sentence than the sentence levied at trial).
70. See id. at 1384-85, 1390-91 (remarking that the record is unclear whether
counsel believed it would be impossible to charge the defendant with assault with
intent to murder because he shot the victim below the waist or whether counsel thought
this argument would prove that the defendant lacked the requisite specific intent, while
noting that having to stand trial is the prejudice alleged in this case).
71. See id at 1391 (confirming prejudice as evinced by the defendant's sentence,
which was three-and-a-half times greater than the original plea bargain).
72. See id. at 1392 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that Cooper is precluded
from Sixth Amendment relief because he went through a complete and fair trial, was
found unanimously guilty by a jury of his peers, and received a fair sentence).
73. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (indicating that the
Sixth Amendment's purpose is ensuring a fair trial and that this purpose is the standard
for determining the validity of ineffective counsel claims).
74. See Brief Amici Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation and the
National District Attorneys Association in Support of Petitioners at 7, Lafler v. Cooper,
132 S. Ct. 1376 (2011) (Nos. 10-209, 10-444) (observing that the only constitutional
claims where the government's mistake is not the reason for the overturned conviction
are claims of ineffective assistance of counsel).
75. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1395 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the ultimate
purpose of a Strickland analysis is to assure the fairness of the trial proceeding).
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unfavorable sentence, claimed that his defense attorney failed to provide
effective assistance and caused him to reject a favorable plea offer.76
Cooper's refusal of a plea bargain and decision to go to trial is in fact an
assertion of his Sixth Amendment rights, and the resulting guilty verdict at
trial is not made unfair by his voluntary choice.77  Because the trial
proceeding was fundamentally fair, Cooper has no ground for a Sixth
Amendment claim.78
In fact, the Court's decision in Cooper misconstrues the very purpose
behind the Sixth Amendment protection of effective counsel. 79 Given the
Court's ruling in United States v. Mechanik, the lack of interference with
Cooper's fair trial precludes him from satisfying the Strickland analysis. 80
By holding that a defendant's decision to reject a plea offer and proceed to
trial can give rise to a constitutional violation involving the right to
effective counsel, the Court invalidated a legitimate trial and a unanimous
guilty verdict.8 ' Because the Sixth Amendment's right to effective counsel
was afforded to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial, this decision
incorrectly applies Strickland and distorts the intended purpose behind the
right to effective counsel.82
2. Frye's Conviction Was Established Through His Admission of Guilt;
Thus, He Suffered No Prejudice and Is Precluded from Sixth Amendment
Relief
Like Cooper, Frye does not involve a violation of Sixth Amendment
76. See id at 1396 (interpreting Cooper's decision to go to trial as proof that the
criminal proceeding was not unfair and therefore failed to show Strickland prejudice).
77. See id. at 1395 (opining that the notion that constitutional rights are infringed
when a defendant chooses to go to trial as opposed to accepting a plea bargain ignores
the purpose of Strickland).
78. See id. at 1397-98 (stating explicitly that there is no doubt of Cooper's guilt and
that his Sixth Amendment rights were fully honored throughout his fair criminal trial).
79. See id. at 1395-96 (reciting the articulated standard used by the Michigan Court
of Appeals in deciding this case, and proposing that prejudice under Strickland must
deprive defendants of a fair trial).
80. See United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 70 (1986) (reasoning that the
guilty verdict at trial shows defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; thus, any
error committed by the grand jury in charging the defendant is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt); see also Brief Amici Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, supra note 74, at 5-6 (assuming that Cooper's decision not to cite
Mechanik in his brief is based on his inability to reconcile it with his legal argument
and desired outcome).
81. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1396-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (correcting the
District Court's remedy by ordering the state to reoffer the plea bargain and, if the
defendant chooses to accept it, allowing the state trial court to exercise discretion in
sentencing the defendant).
82. See id at 1395-98 (asserting that the defendant in this case received the highest
standard of American justice).
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rights because Strickland prejudice cannot be sufficiently shown.83 Frye's
second guilty plea and the proceedings leading up to it were not corrupted
by any mistake caused by counsel's ineffectiveness.84 In fact, Frye
intelligently and voluntarily entered his second guilty plea and, in doing so,
accepted the validity of his conviction. Because there was no error in the
process leading to Frye's second guilty plea, he cannot argue a denial of his
right to a fair trial. The Sixth Amendment's purpose is to protect a
defendant's right to a fundamentally fair trial; therefore, Frye did not suffer
a constitutionally significant violation. For this reason, the Court's
decision to extend the Sixth Amendment's protection of the right to
effective counsel to this case goes against the very purpose behind the
creation of that right as articulated in Strickland." Thus, the Court erred
when it remanded the case to the Missouri Court of Appeals, ordering an
application of the Strickland test in order to rule on whether the defendant
suffered a Sixth Amendment violation. 89
Although the defense attorney in Frye did not communicate the plea
bargain to the defendant, this does not satisfy Strickland prejudice because
Frye merely lost an unrecognized plea offer that presented no constitutional
issue due to its lack of recognition before a court.90 To show Strickland
83. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1412 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(finding Frye's conviction evidently fair as acknowledged by Frye himself, thus failing
the prejudice prong of the Strickland test).
84. Compare Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1406 (distinguishing this case from Lockhart and
Padilla because the alleged error occurred before the accepted plea bargain), with Hill
v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (identifying the petitioner's argument that his
guilty plea was based on erroneous information from his counsel constituting
ineffective assistance), and Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010)
(imposing a duty on attorneys to advise defendants about the deportation consequences
of a guilty plea before it is entered).
85. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that Frye
had no entitlement to the plea deal in this case because the trial court probably would
have rejected the original plea bargain given Frye's subsequent offense).
86. But see id. at 1407 (majority opinion) (holding that it does not suffice to argue
that a fair trial remedies all mistakes during the pre-trial phase, particularly given the
monumental role that plea bargaining plays in the criminal justice system).
87. See id. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (maintaining that Sixth Amendment
analysis is only proper when it keeps with the Amendment's focus on facilitation of a
fair trial); see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (setting forth
the benchmark for evaluating claims of ineffective counsel as the fairness of the trial in
question).
88. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686 (remarking that the Supreme Court has
established the minimum requirements necessary to demonstrate right of effective
counsel violations and that further protections are left to the discretion of lower courts).
89. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (asserting that the showing of a Sixth Amendment
violation in the case hinges on whether the trial court or the prosecutor would have
cancelled the agreement upon Frye's subsequent crimes).
90. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 34, at 18-19 (holding that a lack of opportunity to accept a plea offer fails to
constitute one of the defendant's rights under the law).
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prejudice, the Court in Frye required the defendant to show a reasonable
probability that: (1) he would have accepted the earlier plea offer, and (2) if
the prosecution or trial court had discretion to cancel the offer, that neither
would have done so.91 Plea bargains, though, are not constitutionally
significant until a court's acceptance of the guilty plea.92 In Frye's case,
the court would not have considered his plea bargain before his second
offense, and this new charge would likely have prevented the trial court
from accepting the original plea offer. 93 Therefore, the failure of Frye's
attorney to present him with a plea offer before his subsequent offense and
decision to plead guilty does not interfere with the constitutionality of his
conviction.94 In subjecting the facts of Frye to the prejudice prong of
Strickland, the Court noted the difficulty of proving prejudicial effect
because Frye's most recent infraction caused doubt that the prosecution
would have maintained the original plea offer.9 5
B. Applying Strickland to Cooper and Frye Leads to the Presumption That
Defendants Have a Right to Receive a Plea Offer; This Inference Is
Completely Refuted by Precedent.
Applying the Strickland standard to Cooper creates an implied notion
that there is a constitutional right to plea bargaining; this is entirely
precluded by case law. 96 The Court stated that this rule-that there is no
91. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409-10 (noting that any amount of additional time in
prison has Sixth Amendment significance and asserting that defendants are not
guaranteed a right to be offered a plea bargain, nor a right to have a judge accept a plea
bargain).
92. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 34, at 18 (stating that plea bargains can be revoked by prosecutors at any time
before they are recognized by the court even if the defendant has accepted the offer).
93. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (doubting that the prosecution and trial court
would have maintained the original plea offer following Frye's subsequent incident, but
allowing this question to be decided by the trial court).
94. See id. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that counsel's error caused
no injury to Frye, as he only lost the opportunity to accept a plea bargain that would
have been withdrawn before its confirmation by the court); see also Brief for the
United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 34, at 19 (remarking
that defendants can plead guilty when defense counsel has failed to present a plea offer
and the guilty plea can still be reliable).
95. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (remanding the case to the Missouri Court of
Appeals to determine whether a reasonable probability exists that defendant,
prosecution, and the trial court would have accepted the offer).
96. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(commenting that this decision turns plea bargaining into a constitutional entitlement);
see, e.g., Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (finding that, because defendants have no right to
plea bargaining, a showing of Strickland prejudice requires defendants to show that
both the prosecutor and court would have enforced the offer); see also Ethan D.
Feldman & Meghan P. Saleebay, Victims' Rights and Defendants' Rights: Is There a
Conflict?, 36 COLO. LAW. 45, 47 (2007) (observing that defendants have no right to a
plea bargain and thus have no right to plea bargain immediately).
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constitutional right to plea bargain-is inconsequential to the ruling in
Cooper.97 However, the Cooper holding invalidated a legitimate trial in
favor of a plea bargain offered before the proceeding. 98  The decision
indicates that defendants can reject a plea bargain under their Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial, be found guilty in a trial, and then have that
conviction invalidated and the original plea reinstated because of a mistake
by defense counsel. 99 This implies an entitlement under the Constitution to
plea bargaining, although no such entitlement is constitutionally
recognized.'00
The Frye decision also leads to an inference that effective plea
bargaining is elevated to an established constitutional right.o'0 In Frye, the
State argued that defendants do not have a right to receive a plea bargain. 0 2
The Court explained that, while this argument is logical, plea bargains have
become prevalent in criminal procedure. 03 Thus, it is necessary to ensure
that defendants retain effective counsel during the plea bargaining
process.104 However, the entire process leading to Frye's second guilty
plea was untainted by attorney error. os Consequently, the Frye holding
signifies that even if a defendant's right to a fair, full trial is protected and
the defendant admits guilt through the plea bargaining process, the
defendant is still entitled to a previous plea bargain if he can meet the two
97. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1387 (contending that once a state makes a plea offer,
it is bound to uphold the requirements of the Constitution).
98. See id. at 1391 (ordering the State to reoffer the plea-agreement and vacating
the original verdict after trial).
99. See id. at 1388 (conveying that a fair trial does not negate ineffective
performance by counsel; therefore, a guilty verdict at trial does not preclude a
defendant from his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel).
100. See id at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (opining that the Court's holding in
Cooper changes plea bargaining from an adjunct of the criminal justice system to a
requirement).
101. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that plea
bargaining is not covered under the protection of the Sixth Amendment, which ensures
fair convictions as opposed to fair plea bargains).
102. See id. at 1407 (majority opinion) (observing the persuasiveness of the State's
argument against subjecting it to the mistakes of defense attorneys).
103. See id. (discussing the notion that defense counsel must satisfy certain
responsibilities, including but not limited to plea bargains, under the Sixth Amendment
given the crucial role that plea bargaining plays in the criminal process).
104. See id. at 1407-08 (mentioning that deals between prosecutors and defense
attorneys determine defendants' sentences).
105. Compare id. at 1406 (noting that this case involved no mistakes from counsel
leading to acceptance of the guilty plea by the court), with Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.
Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010) (pinpointing the issue of the case as whether an attorney's failure
to advise his client of prescient information regarding deportation consequences can
give rise to a Sixth Amendment claim) and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)
(identifying the defendant's argument that his guilty plea was invalid because his
attorney supplied him with incorrect information about his parole eligibility).
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prongs of the Strickland analysis.' 06  In effect, the Court overturned an
untainted, fair conviction, thereby punishing the victim of a crime for
defense counsel's incompetence rather than punishing the attorney
responsible for the mistake.10 7
C. The Remedies Discussed in Cooper and Frye Violate Legal Boundaries
and Are Too Inefficient, Illogical, and Arbitrary to Constitute Effective
Law.
By holding that specific performance of a previous plea bargain can
provide an appropriate remedy for defendants who were not permitted to
accept the plea offer, the Court in Frye risks violating the discretion of
prosecutors."os In Missouri, for example, prosecutors are free to cancel a
plea bargain until a guilty plea is offered in court. 109 The remedy suggested
by Frye would allow trial court judges to mandate reinstatement of an
original plea bargain, effectively eliminating prosecutorial discretion from
the plea bargaining process." 0 The State in Frye argued against subjecting
prosecutors to the consequences of defense counsel's pretrial mistakes-
particularly when a fair trial has subsequently taken place."'
In addition, Frye's remedy arguably violates the separation of powers
doctrine at the federal level.1 2  Prosecutorial choices involving plea
bargaining fall under executive authority."' However, the remedy
suggested by Frye can, in some circumstances, result in a judicial order that
a prosecutor reoffer a previously presented plea bargain.114 Such a judicial
106. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (claiming that procedures for plea bargaining are
often unsupervised and somewhat nebulous).
107. See id. at 1414 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Court is limited to
overturning convictions in solving these problems, whereas a legislature could punish
attorneys for errors and remedy these mistakes more efficiently).
108. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 34, at 29-30 (noting that prosecutors should have broad discretion before trial to
use new information to accurately determine the social interest in specific
prosecutions).
109. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (mentioning that Missouri law typically allows
plea offers to be withdrawn by prosecutors "without recourse," even when the
defendant has accepted the offer).
110. See id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that it is extremely unwise to
retroactively determine the manner by which prosecutors and trial court judges use
their discretion).
S11. See id at 1407 (majority opinion) (alleging that the State's arguments fail to
account for the reality of the criminal justice system).
112. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 34, at 30-31 (noting that the executive branch has significant discretion in
promulgating federal laws).
113. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-93 (1974) (contending that the
executive branch is responsible for enforcing criminal laws in order to determine
whether the federal judiciary violated executive authority).
114. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1411 (ruling that state law is the place to determine
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mandate would bind a prosecutor to a plea offer that he never accepted and
eliminate his discretion from the process."' This constitutes a judicial
intrusion into the scope of executive power of the prosecutor, and,
therefore, violates the separation of powers between the judiciary and the
executive branches at the federal level."16
Furthermore, the remedy implemented in Cooper is repetitive given the
requirements necessary to show ineffective counsel under Strickland."
According to the Court, the appropriate remedy for this violation must be
tailored to the injury while not entirely absolving the defendant or
overusing prosecutorial resources." 8 The Court determined in Cooper that
the correct remedy for prejudicial violations of the Sixth Amendment right
to effective assistance of counsel is requiring the State to reoffer the plea
agreement and allowing the defendant to choose whether he will accept
it.' 19 This requirement fails to comport with judicial efficiency because a
defendant attempting to prove a Sixth Amendment violation under
Strickland must show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted
the plea offer.12 0
The Court's creation of a remedy for the alleged constitutional violation
in Cooper gives far too much power to trial court judges.121 In Cooper, the
remedy established by the Court is such that, once a defendant accepts a
reoffered plea agreement following violation of his right to effective
counsel, the trial court has discretion whether to vacate all convictions and
order performance of the plea agreement, vacate some convictions and
whether the prosecution would have maintained, and the trial court would have
accepted, the original plea bargain).
115. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 34, at 31 (remarking that judicial enforcement of a previous plea bargain prevents
prosecutorial determination of the fairest sentence based on the alleged offense, the
defendant's history, and the State's resources).
116. See id. at 30-31 (commenting that a reanimation of an original plea offer as a
mandatory criminal sentence would force the judiciary to take control of an exclusively
executive duty).
117. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1396-97 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(inquiring why it is necessary to reoffer a plea agreement when the Strickland analysis
requires a showing that the defendant would have accepted the original offer).
118. See id. at 1388-89 (majority opinion) (explaining that there are numerous costs
associated with the reversal of a conviction, not least of which is that witnesses may be
required to relive traumatic occurrences for a second time in court).
119. See id at 1391 (noting that the State must reoffer the plea agreement and,
assuming the defendant accepts the plea offer, the trial court has discretion in
determining the correct convictions and sentence).
120. See id. at 1385 (requiring defendants to show that the plea bargain would have
been presented to the court and accepted by it).
121. See id at 1396-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the Court's decision to
allow a trial court judge to choose a remedy for an unconstitutional conviction and
surmising that the motivation behind this remedy is to compensate for the lack of an
actual constitutional violation in this case).
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resentence the defendant, or implement the original sentence at trial.12 2 The
Court advised that the appropriate remedy for these cases must ameliorate
the harm caused by the Sixth Amendment violation while not wasting
prosecutorial resources or giving the defendant a windfall.12 3 However,
invalidation after trial of all convictions by a unanimous guilty verdict
would seem to constitute both a waste of prosecutorial resources and a
windfall for the defendant.12 4 Justice Scalia comments in his dissent in
Cooper that the remedy proposed by the Court is bizarre, as it presents the
possibility that leaving the original sentence intact-effectively doing
nothing-could solve a violation of a defendant's constitutional rights.12 5
As these examples illustrate, the Court's created remedy in Cooper gives
too much power to trial court judges. 2 6
Additionally, the remedy created by the Court in Cooper-discretionary
sentencing after a conviction is ruled unconstitutional due to ineffective
counsel during plea bargaining-is inarticulate and illogical.127  The
Court's decision to note two factors relevant to these remedies, but not to
provide full guidance on this discretionary sentencing, is arbitrary and fails
to ensure that the constitutional harm will be remedied.12 8 The explicit
reference to the possibility that the trial court judge can maintain the
original conviction following an infringement of a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective counsel demonstrates that amelioration of the
harm is not ensured through the remedy provided in Cooper.129 Because
122. See id. at 1391 (majority opinion) (correcting the remedy suggested by the
District Court by mandating the sentence of the original plea agreement).
123. See id at 1388-89 (suggesting that Sixth Amendment remedies should be
tailored to the constitutional injury and should not encroach upon the other purposes of
the criminal justice system).
124. See id. (highlighting that this remedy involves significant social costs, as it
makes key trial personnel and parties exert additional time, money, and effort for a
repeated trial).
125. See id. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's decision to allow
statutes, rules, and trial court judges to create remedies for violations of defendants'
constitutional rights).
126. See id. at 1398-99 (Alito, J., dissenting) (remarking that it is unsound for the
Court to leave the responsibility of determining the limits of Sixth Amendment
remedies to trial court judges).
127. See id. at 1396-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the remedy to a Sixth
Amendment violation leading to a conviction should not be subject to the discretion of
a trial court judge, as the trial judge is not simply accepting a plea agreement but
creating a remedy for a constitutional violation).
128. See id. at 1389 (majority opinion) (noting that both a defendant's willingness to
take responsibility for his actions and evidence discovered after a plea bargain is
offered can be relevant to determining a remedy, while assuming that federal and state
courts will establish the complete standard of factors that trial court judges should
consider when exercising discretion in these cases).
129. See id. at 1396-97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (alleging that the remedy provided by
the Court invalidated a conviction derived from a fair trial, and in doing so failed to
conclusively remedy the constitutional violation because trial court discretion is not
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the solution used in Cooper does not guarantee that the constitutional harm
will be fixed, it is incoherent and potentially ineffective.' 3 0
Lastly, the Court's remedy to the constitutional harm in Cooper could
directly conflict with the standards the Court deemed necessary when
creating this solution by placing an undue burden on prosecutors.' 3 ' The
remedy established in Cooper allows trial court judges to mandate
prosecutorial reoffering of a plea bargain where they deem it necessary to
redress the constitutional harm.' 32 In his dissent, Justice Alito notes two
examples of situations where a mandatory reoffering of a plea bargain
would constitute an abuse of discretion.1 33 The first example is when vital
information concerning a defendant's guilt surfaces following rejection of a
plea bargain, and the second example is when the prosecution incurs
significant costs of limited resources due to rejection of a plea offer.134 In
both circumstances, ordering the prosecution to reoffer the plea bargain
would cause an undue burden for prosecutors and would not comport with
the requirements of such a remedy as set forth by the Court.'3 5
IV. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The Court's decisions in Cooper and Frye-finding Strickland prejudice
while refusing to identify the requirements of defense counsel or qualities
constituting ineffective counsel-create numerous legal difficulties. 3 6 The
proper for a constitutional harm).
130. See id at 1397 (distinguishing the perceived notion that this case involves
courts' acceptance or rejection of plea bargains from the actuality that this case
involves discretionary establishment of a resolution for an unconstitutional criminal
conviction).
131. See id. at 1398 (likening the Court's understanding of criminal law as
interpreted in Cooper to a casino, where the state gives defendants the opportunity to
plea bargain and win a lighter sentence, but any defendant "excluded from the tables"
can assert his Sixth Amendment rights).
132. See id. at 1389 (majority opinion) (asserting that in circumstances where plea
bargains must be reoffered, trial court judges may choose either to accept the plea and
overturn the conviction or reject the plea and uphold the conviction).
133. See id. at 1399 (Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that the Court understands
how required renewal of a plea bargain would cause significant injustice in numerous
circumstances).
134. See id. at 1398 (noting that the Court's decision creates the potential for abuse
of discretion and relies on trial court judges to apply the rule in Cooper in a manner
that will not lead to unjust reversal of decisions).
135. See id. at 1388-89 (majority opinion) (prefacing their creation of a remedy with
the rule that such solutions must not impede competing interests such as justice for
victims and security of prosecutorial resources).
136. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (failing to define the
responsibilities of defense attorneys because it would be imprudent and unfeasible to
do so given the role of alternative tactics in negotiation); Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1391(lacking guidance for the standard necessary to show deficient performance of counsel
during plea bargaining because ineffective counsel was conceded by both parties).
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Court in Frye admitted that defining the responsibilities of defense counsel
is difficult due to the distinctive nature of trial advocacy.'37 However, the
Court also declared that Frye was not the appropriate occasion to explain
the responsibilities of defense attorneys in the plea bargaining process.,3 8
The Court's lack of guidance on effective performance is also present in
Frye: in subjecting the facts of Frye to the performance prong of
Strickland, the Court mentioned that the standards for professional practice
provide a guide for effective performance of counsel. 39  However, the
Court explicitly refused to define the duties of defense counsel in plea
bargaining.14 0
The complexities of defining what constitutes effective assistance during
plea bargaining should have precluded the Court from applying
constitutional analysis to the facts in Frye.'4 ' The Court gives deference to
reasonable tactical decisions, but finds ineffective assistance of counsel
when an attorney unreasonably chooses not to investigate a necessary
element of a defendant's case; thus, retroactive analysis of attorney
performance under Strickland can hinge on the difficult determination of
whether a Court finds counsel's performance to be reasonable based on
tactical choices.142 Justice Scalia noted in his dissent in Frye that "hard-
bargaining" presents just one example of the incredibly thin line between
tactical decisions and Sixth Amendment violations as a result of Cooper
and Frye.143
Additionally, the determination of whether ineffective assistance of
counsel has a prejudicial effect and meets the prejudice prong of the
Strickland test will present more difficulties in cases where a defendant's
potential acceptance of a previous plea bargain is less certain.144 The Court
137. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (suggesting that plea bargaining is contingent on
an attorney's personal style and the tactics necessitated by each individual case).
138. See id (explaining that it is only necessary to determine whether defense
counsel must communicate offers to defendants to decide the outcome of this case, but
nothing more).
139. See id. (citing the American Bar Association's recommendation that defense
attorneys explain all plea offers to defendants with punctuality).
140. See id (finding the expiration of a plea offer prior to Frye evaluating it as
sufficient to constitute ineffective assistance under the Sixth Amendment).
141. See id. at 1412 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (contending that the issue of whether
defense counsel is sufficient for Sixth Amendment purposes will be less clearly decided
in other cases).
142. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984) (affirming that
counsel is responsible for either performing reasonable investigations or coming to a
reasonable decision that renders additional investigation unnecessary).
143. See Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1412-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing the logic
behind the possibility that a "hard-bargaining" attorney could violate his client's
constitutional rights in an attempt to effectively assist future clients).
144. See id. at 1413 (remarking that the Court's analysis of the prejudice prong of
the Strickland test demonstrates the complexities of proving prejudice in these cases).
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indicated that determining whether a defendant would have accepted an
earlier plea bargain, although easy to determine in Frye, might pose a more
difficult question in different circumstances. 145
Further, in cases like Frye where the state of jurisdiction allows plea
bargains to be withdrawn by the prosecution, the Court must speculate
about whether the prosecution would have done so.146 Additionally, the
Court must consider whether the trial court would have accepted the plea
bargain.147 While both of these questions were easy to resolve in Frye, the
estimation as to whether the prosecution and trial court would have
proceeded with an original plea offer may prove difficult in later cases.148
Frye creates a tension between two competing ethical principles for
defense counsel.14 9 Defense attorneys are expected not only to pursue the
optimal sentences for defendants, but also to promptly communicate plea
bargains to defendants.' 5 0 The new rule established by Frye brings with it a
realistic possibility that counsel's failure to communicate a plea offer will
provide the best possible result for a defendant. 5' Effectively, this decision
could give defendants "two bites at the apple" by allowing defense
attorneys to retain an offer as a maximum possible sentence for their client,
due to the fact that a setback during trial could prompt a defense attorney to
suddenly discover the plea offer and later communicate it to the defendant,
thereby allowing the defendant to claim ineffective assistance under
Strickland. 52
145. See id at 1411 (concluding that in some cases it may be required to provide
more than a subsequent guilty plea or a harsher sentence in order to demonstrate
reasonable probability that a defendant would have accepted a previous plea offer).
146. See id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rephrasing the Court's process for
Strickland analysis of cases similar to Frye as a form of retrospective crystal-ball
gazing).
147. See id. (remarking that Frye's subsequent infraction makes the prejudice prong
of the Strickland analysis easier in this case).
148. See id. (reasoning that while Frye's second infraction leads to a clear
assumption that Strickland prejudice cannot be shown, this decision will likely prompt
numerous cases that will not be easily decided where a defendant does not commit a
subsequent offense).
149. See Reply Brief at 17, Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2011) (No. 10-444)
[hereinafter Missouri v. Frye Reply Briefj (clarifying that the State is not implying that
defense attorneys will deliberately violate ethical duties, but rather that defense
attorneys may be compelled to choose their ethical responsibility to procure the best
sentence for a defendant over their ethical duty to promptly communicate plea offers).
150. See id (reasoning that this ethical dilemma will become even more prominent
in cases involving higher charges, where the State offers a beneficial plea bargain at the
beginning of the criminal process).
151. See id at 17-18 (confirming that the rule under Frye will allow defendants to
retain the benefit of a reduced sentence in the original plea bargain while taking a
chance of acquittal at trial).
152. See id. at 19 (contending that because American Bar Association standards only
provide a base guideline for counsel's behavior and do not set forth any additional
requirements of counsel, defense attorneys may be tempted to remain silent about
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Lastly, these cases could make plea bargaining a more difficult and
cumbersome criminal process.153 Because prosecutors are burdened when
a defense attorney makes a mistake due to ineffectiveness, they could
understandably be hesitant to offer a plea bargain, particularly in important
cases that may necessitate a great deal of prosecutorial resources.' 5 4
Further, this movement from off-the-record discussions towards open
formality and structure in plea bargaining could bind together the trial
courts and plea offers until the process is significantly less efficient.'55
Moreover, prosecutorial hesitance to offer pleas could neutralize the
benefits of plea bargaining,' 56 and without plea bargaining, the long and
expensive criminal justice process could become overwhelmed.'5
V. CONCLUSION
The Court's analysis in Cooper and Frye failed to account for the
purpose behind the Sixth Amendment's right to effective counsel.'5 8 Thus,
the Court should overturn the decisions in these two cases and return to the
narrow jurisprudence of constitutional claims involving effective counsel
that was originally promulgated by Strickland. " Failure to do so could
significantly complicate and burden the plea bargaining process and,
offers to ensure a benefit for their client). But see David A. Perez, Deal or No Deal?
Remedying Ineffective Assistance of Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J.
1532, 1575 (2011) (proposing that the risk of conviction at trial and failing on an
ineffective counsel plea would ward off those defendants intelligent enough to exploit
the system).
153. See Missouri v. Frye Reply Brief, supra note 149, at 19-20 (proposing that the
problems with the Frye ruling are evident not only when defense counsel intends to
withhold a plea bargain based on strategy, but also when defense counsel inadvertently
fails to communicate a plea bargain).
154. See id. at 20 (surmising that prosecutors' fear of mistakes resulting from
ineffective defense counsel will cause the plea bargaining process to become
disjointed).
155. See id. (asserting that the rule articulated in Frye would substantially and
unnecessarily weigh down the criminal justice system due to its effects on plea
bargaining).
156. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-08 (2012) (affirming that the plea
bargaining process benefits both defendants and prosecutors by granting lighter
sentences to the former and conserving the limited resources of the latter).
157. See Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1397 (2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(describing plea bargaining as a necessary evil because the criminal justice system
could not sustain itself if every case were resolved by trial); see also Albert W.
Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 38 (1979) (claiming
that Supreme Court decisions led to a logjam of criminal cases, thus raising the
intensity of plea bargaining).
158. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1393 (surmising that the right to effective assistance
of counsel only is relevant insofar as it impacts a defendant's right to a fair trial).
159. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) (proposing that
evaluation of claims of attorney ineffectiveness hinge on whether counsel's mistake
interfered with the defendant's right to a fair trial).
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consequently, the justice system as a whole.160 Even if the Court refuses to
reverse its decisions in Cooper and Frye, the Court should reexamine the
remedies implemented in the cases, as they are illogical and place too much
power in the hands of trial court judges.' 6'
160. See Missouri v. Frye Reply Brief, supra note 149, at 20 (claiming that the
remedy proposed in Frye would not encourage punctual disclosure of plea bargains or
promote optimal legal advice for clients).
161. See Cooper, 132 S. Ct. at 1399 (Alito, J., dissenting) (concluding that it is
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